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INTRODUCTION
The vast majority of births in the United States take place in a hospital
setting.1 Trends over the past decade suggest, however, that the number of
hospital births has been declining. Between 2004 and 2013, there was a 56
percent increase in non-hospital births in the United States.2 Most of these
non-hospital births took place at home or in a birthing center3 and were
attended by a midwife.4 There are many factors that may be influencing
this upswing in non-hospital births—these include grassroots advocacy by
groups promoting home birth, efforts to expand access to midwifery
through state legislatures,5 and growing awareness of the high number of
medical interventions that often occur in hospital births.6 Women desire
meaningful options concerning care and medical intervention during
childbirth, and this interest is not confined to whether the birth will occur in
the hospital. Women also often want to have the final say over other
decisions regarding their pregnancy and labor—for example, the decisions
to take medication, to agree to certain invasive tests, or to give birth
vaginally or through cesarean section.
Yet there are various legal obstacles to the exercise of such choices, both
at home and in the hospital. These include state licensure laws that restrict
the practice of midwifery; the failure of courts to recognize constitutional
protections for midwives, their clients, and pregnant women who
experience unwanted medical interventions during childbirth; and the
narrow scope of malpractice remedies for individuals, compared with
hospitals’ interest in limiting possible malpractice liability.
1. See MARIAN F. MACDORMAN ET AL., NATIONAL CENTER FOR HEALTH
STATISTICS, TRENDS IN OUT-OF-HOSPITAL BIRTHS IN THE UNITED STATES, 1990–2012
(2014),
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/databriefs/db144.htm#x2013;2012</a>
[hereinafter MacDorman et al., 2014].
2. See id.
3. See id.
4. See id.
5. See e.g., State Resource Center, AM. C. OF NURSE-MIDWIVES,
http://www.midwife.org/State-Resource-Center; CPMS Legal Status by State, THE BIG
PUSH FOR MIDWIVES, http://pushformidwives.org/ (last visited Apr. 20, 2015).
6. See e.g., Grassroots Advocacy, AM. C. OF NURSE-MIDWIVES,
http://www.midwife.org/Grassroots-Advocacy (last visited Apr. 20, 2015).
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Recent developments in the U.S. health care system have created new
legal protections that may increase women’s access to choice in birth. Two
provisions of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010
(ACA) prohibit discrimination against providers and patients, respectively.7
Section 2706(a) of Title XXVII of the ACA [hereinafter “Section
2706(a)”], which went into effect in January 2014, prohibits health
insurance issuers from discriminating against “any health care provider
who is acting within the scope of that provider’s license or certification
under applicable state law.”8 This prohibits insurance companies that
participate in the healthcare marketplace from refusing coverage of
midwifery services in states where midwives are licensed providers.
Section 1557 of Title XLII [hereinafter “Section 1557”] of the ACA
prohibits discrimination by health care providers against certain patients.9
This law is the first civil rights provision to protect women from sex-based
discrimination in healthcare; it also prohibits discrimination on the basis of
race, color, national origin, age, or disabilities.10
This paper explores how the ACA’s nondiscrimination provisions may
increase women’s ability to make crucial choices about pregnancy and
childbirth, ranging from choosing where to give birth, choosing whether to
use the services of a midwife, and deciding which medical interventions are
desired—and when they are necessary. Part I offers a background of
choice in birth, explaining trends in childbirth historically, in the United
States today, and in other developed countries. It also clarifies the
difference between midwives and physicians, explains the arguments for
and against home births, and explains several issues women sometimes
face in hospital births. Part II discusses the legal obstacles to home birth,
including state licensure laws and the failure of courts to recognize
constitutional, antitrust, and other legal arguments as protecting unlicensed
midwives and their clients; it then describes how the nondiscrimination
provisions of the ACA may increase access to home birth, birth at a birth
center, and midwifery services. Part III explains the legal obstacles women
face when they experience emotional trauma or injury at the hands of an
obstetrician or other medical staff during childbirth and argues that the
recently passed civil rights law may be more effective than tort law at
systematically addressing forced detainment and medical treatment of
7.
8.
9.
10.

42 U.S.C. § 18001 et seq. (2012).
42 U.S.C.§ 300gg-5 (2012).
42 U.S.C. § 18116 (2012).
Section 1557 of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, U.S. DEP’T OF
HEALTH
&
HUMAN
SERVS.,
http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/civilrights/understanding/section1557/ (last visited Mar. 7,
2016).

Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2015

3

Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law, Vol. 24, Iss. 3 [2015], Art. 1

340

JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY & THE LAW

[Vol. 24:3

pregnant women by medical personnel, as well as holes in informed
consent with pregnant patients. Part IV concludes.
I.

CHOICE IN CHILDBIRTH

A. History of Midwifery and Childbirth in the United States
As the Introduction notes, home birth in the United States has gained
steam rapidly over the course of the last decade. In 2012, 1.36 percent of
births occurred outside of a hospital.11 This is a small percentage of
births—but it is up from 87 percent of births in 2004, which marks a 56
percent increase after several decades of very low rates of out-of-hospital
births.12 In several states, the percentage of births occurring outside of the
hospital is even higher than the national average, ranging from 3 to 6
percent of all births.13 About two-thirds of non-hospital births in the
United States take place at home, while one-third occur in a birth center.14
The sudden increase in home births is something of an anomaly in the
modern-day United States, but is not so unusual when compared to
modern-day childbirth norms in other developed countries15 or even the
history of childbirth in the United States. Childbirth was not considered a
“medical” event for much of U.S. history,16 and from colonial times until
the Great Depression, most births were attended by a midwife.17
Several social and medical changes, beginning with the use of anesthesia
during childbirth in the Victorian period, led to the gradual medicalization
of childbirth—and the movement of childbirth from the home to the
hospital.18 Milestones such as the invention of penicillin and the
11. See MacDorman et al., 2014, supra note 1.
12. See id.
13. See id. (“In 2012, out-of-hospital births comprised 3%–6% of births in Alaska,

Idaho, Montana, Oregon, Pennsylvania, and Washington, and between 2% and 3% of
births in Delaware, Indiana, Utah, Vermont, and Wisconsin.”).
14. See id. (defining a birth center as a homelike healthcare facility staffed by
midwives).
15. See infra Part I (iii).
16. See LAUREL THATCHER ULRICH, A MIDWIFE’S TALE: THE LIFE OF MARTHA
BALLARD, BASED ON HER DIARY, 1785-1812 183 (1991).
17. See JUDITH WALZER LEAVITT, BROUGHT TO BED: CHILD-REARING IN AMERICA,
1750-1950 12 (1986).
18. See Richard B Clark, Fanny Longfellow and Nathan Keep, AMERICAN
SOCIETY
OF
ANESTHESIOLOGISTS
http://anestit.unipa.it/mirror/asa2/newsletters/1997/09_97/FannyLongfellow_0997.html
(last visited Feb. 26, 2016) (stating the first known recipient of anesthesia during
childbirth in the United States was Fanny Longfellow, the wife of Henry Wadsworth
Longfellow. After the birth, Fanny praised the anesthesia, writing to friends that she
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dissemination of information on sanitation actually ended a trend of
hospital births having higher fatality rates than home births, which was due
to the spread of infection in hospital wards.19 In 1900, there were still
relatively few births taking place in hospitals.20 By 1950, more than 80
percent of births took place in the hospital, under the care of a physician,
rather than a midwife;21 by 1969, the percentage rose to 99 percent of
births.22
1.

Childbirth Today: United States

Until 2004, the rate of hospital birth for U.S. women hovered around 99
percent.23 Beginning in 2004, until 2012, the last year for which data is
available, the rate of hospital births declined. In this time period, most
home births were to non-Hispanic white women. In 2012, the rate of
planned home births remained below 1 percent for African American,
Hispanic, American Indian, and Asian/Pacific Islander women, while 2.05
percent of births to non-Hispanic white women occurred outside of the
hospital.24 There are higher rates of out of hospital births in the
northwestern states: Washington, Montana, Oregon, Idaho, and Alaska all
have out of hospital birth rates of 3 percent or more.25 There is also
evidence that home birth has become safer over the past decade. Between
2004, and 2012, the percentage of out-of-hospital births resulting in
preterm babies declined from 6.7 percent to 4.4 percent, and the proportion
born at low birth weight declined from 4.8 percent to 3.2 percent.26 In
2009, most home births were attended by midwives—about 62 percent.27

felt “like a pioneer to less suffering for poor, weak womankind); see also Charles B.
Pittinger, Letter to the Editor, The Anesthetization of Fanny Longfellow for Childbirth
on April 7, 1847, 66 ANESTHESIA & ANALGESIA 368, 369 (1987).
19. See JACQUELINE H. WOLF, DELIVER ME FROM PAIN: ANESTHESIA AND BIRTH
IN AMERICA (2011); Chris Hafner-Eaton & Laurie K. Pearce, Birth Choices, the Law,
and Medicine: Balancing Individual Freedoms and Protection of the Public Health, 19
J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 813, 815 (1994).
20. See MARIAN F. MACDORMAN ET AL., NATIONAL CENTER FOR HEALTH
STATISTICS, HOME BIRTHS IN THE UNITED STATES: 1990-2009 1 (2012),
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/databriefs/db84.pdf [hereinafter MacDorman et al.,
2012].
21. WALZER LEAVITT, supra note 17, at 12.
22. See MacDorman et al., 2012, supra note 20, at 1.
23. Id.
24. MacDorman et al., 2014, supra note 1, at 2.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
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About 7 percent of hospital births are attended by midwives,28 and over 90
percent of hospital births are attended by a physician—over 90 percent.29
There has been an increase in midwife attendance to women in hospital
births.30 Because the percentage of midwife-attended hospital birth is
relatively low, at just over 7 percent,31 there is not reliable data about
whether midwife care in hospital births affects ultimate outcomes in births.
This information would be especially significant in cases of women who
are at-risk for poor childbirth outcomes due to factors such as health
conditions, race and socioeconomic status, or chronic stress. Data suggests
that Certified Nurse Midwives attending hospital birth may perform more
robust screenings of certain risk factors, such as domestic violence.32 This
information would be significant—and especially relevant today. The U.S.
maternal and infant mortality rates33 have been rising over the past
decades.34 Since 1990, the United States has experienced a larger increase
in infant mortality than any developed country,35 and more than forty
countries have lower maternal mortality rates than the United States.36
28. See generally MacDorman et al., 2012, supra note 20, at 3; see also Fact
Sheet: CNM/CM – Attended Birth Statistics in the United States, AM. C. OF NURSEMIDWIVES,
http://www.midwife.org/ACNM/files/ccLibraryFiles/FILENAME/000000004002/CN
M-CM-AttendedBirthStatistics2014_FINAL.pdf (last updated March 2014).
29. See MacDorman et al., 2012, supra note 20, at 3.
30. See CNM/CM-attended Birth Statistics, AM. C. OF NURSE-MIDWIVES,
http://www.midwife.org/CNM/CM-attended-Birth-Statistics (last updated June 2015).
31. See id.
32. See Carolyn M. Sampselle et al., Prevalence of Abuse Among Pregnant
Women Choosing Certified Nurse-Midwife or Physician Providers, 37(4) J.
MIDWIFERY & WOMEN’S HEALTH 269, 273 (1992); see also Marian MacDorman &
Gopal K. Singh, Midwifery Care, Social and Medical Risk Factors, and Birth
Outcomes in the USA, 52 J. EPIDEMIOL. COMMUNITY HEALTH 310, 316 (1998)
(explaining that CNMs tend to spend more time with patients in prenatal visits,
compared with physicians).
33. These indicators measure the number of women who die annually from causes
related to pregnancy and childbirth, and the number of infants who die annually in the
first year of life. The maternal mortality rate is measured per 100,000 live births, and
the infant mortality rate is measured per 1,000 live births.
34. See Nicholas J. Kassebaum, Global, Regional, and National Levels and
Causes of Maternal Mortality During 1990-2013: A Systematic Analysis for the Global
Burden of Disease Study 2013, 384 THE LANCET 98-1004, 990, 998-99 (2014),
http://www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/article/PIIS01040-6736(14)60696-6/fulltext.
35. See generally id.
36. See The World Factbook, Central Intelligence Agency, Country Comparison:
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-worldMaternal
Mortality
Rate,
factbook/rankorder/2223rank.html (last visited Apr. 18 2015); AMNESTY
INTERNATIONAL, MATERNAL HEALTH IN THE U.S., http://www.amnestyusa.org/our-
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Ethnic and racial disparities in these rates have existed for more than one
hundred years37 and continue today. The infant mortality rate for black
women is more than double that of non-Hispanic white women.38 Racial
disparities persist even when factors such as socioeconomic status,
recreational drug and alcohol use, and education level are controlled for.39
Many factors may contribute to rising maternal and infant mortality rates,
including: health conditions; lifestyle choices, including drug or alcohol
use; age; quality of medical care and facilities; and overall wellbeing,
including stress level.40
Because the high percentage of hospital births in the United States does
not seem to correlate with comparatively low rates of maternal and infant
mortality, further studies are necessary for understanding whether aspects
of midwifery care, including emphases on the family unit, physical and
work/campaigns/demand-dignity/maternal-health-is-a-human-right/maternal-health-inthe-us (last visited Apr. 15, 2015).
37. See generally SAM SHAPIRO ET AL., INFANT, PERINATAL, MATERNAL AND
CHILDHOOD MORTALITY IN THE UNITED STATES (1968) (noting that in the United
States, racial disparities have been found in childbirth outcomes since data was first
collected).
38. See Marian F. MacDorman & T.J. Matthews, NAT’L CTR. FOR HEALTH
STATISTICS, UNDERSTANDING RACIAL AND ETHNIC DISPARITIES IN U.S. INFANT
MORTALITY RATES 1 (2011), http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/databriefs/db74.pdf
(noting that the infant mortality rate in 2007 was 2.4 times higher for non-Hispanic
black women than for non-Hispanic white women).
39. See Richard E. Behrman & Adrienne Stith Butler, Sociodemographic and
Community Factors Contributing to Preterm Birth, in PRETERM BIRTH: CAUSES,
CONSEQUENCES,
AND
PREVENTION
(2007),
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK11362/ (“Conventional wisdom often regards
race as a proxy for condition, and some believe that socioeconomic factors (often
measured in terms of educational attainment, household income, or occupational status)
explain differences in preterm birth rates by race. [. . .] However, in most studies the
differences in preterm birth rates, [. . .] birth weights [. . .] and infant mortality rates
[. . .] between African American and white women persisted after adjustment for
(measured) socioeconomic differences. Furthermore, socioeconomic condition does not
confer equal protection across racial-ethnic groups.”); see also L.F. Beck et al.,
Prevalence of Selected Maternal Behaviors and Experiences, Pregnancy Risk
Assessment Monitoring System (PRAMS), 1999, 51 SS02 MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY
WKLY REP. 1, 27 (2002) (finding that black women are less likely than white women
to report smoking during pregnancy); M. Serdula et. al., Trends in Alcohol
Consumption by Pregnant Women, 1985 through 1988, 265 JAMA, 876, 879 (1991).
40. See generally Charles J. Homer et al, Work-Related Psychosocial Stress and
Risk of Preterm, Low Birthweight Delivery, 80 AM. J. OF PUB. HEALTH, 173, 177 (1990),
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1404615/pdf/amjph00215-0037.pdf
(finding that women working during pregnancy in jobs characterized by high demand
and low control were twice as likely to deliver a low birthweight, preterm infant,
compared with women working in less stressful jobs).
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psychological health both before and after the birth; and the provision of
individualized education and counseling may be useful in combating these
rising mortality rates and other adverse outcomes in birth.41
2.

Childbirth Today: Europe

Several European countries provide interesting counterexamples to the
United States, due to higher rates of home birth and higher rates of
midwife-attended births. In the Netherlands, which has an official system
for home birth, hospital birth is not the standard but is one of several
accepted alternatives. In 2010, more than 16 percent of births in the
Netherlands took place in the home and more than 11 percent took place in
a birthing center.42 Several other European countries have rates of home
births that exceed that of the United States but that do not reach the
Netherlands’ rates. In Wales, 3.7 percent of births occur at home; in
England, 2.7 percent; in Iceland, 1.8 percent.43 In Germany, Denmark, and
Belgium, home births account for between 1 and 2 percent of all births.44
In addition to having higher rates of home births, several European
countries also see an extremely high percentage of hospital births attended
by midwives. In Denmark and France, midwives attend nearly all births,
whether they take place at home or in the hospital.45 More than 70 percent
of births are attended by midwives in England, Ireland, and Germany.46 In
the United States, midwives attend just 7 percent of hospital births.47
The maternity care customs in the European countries mentioned above,
while not identical, share several characteristics, which may shed light
upon both why women in the United States wish to seek midwifery
services and a home birth, and also the motivations of governments that
promote midwifery and home birth. First, as evidenced by the high rates of
midwives attending both home and hospital births, these countries tend to
incorporate midwives into standard maternity care.48 They also promote
home birth as safe.49 For a recent example, Britain’s national health
41. Midwives
Model
of
Care,
CITIZENS
FOR
MIDWIFERY,
http://cfmidwifery.org/mmoc/define.aspx.
42. EURO PERISTAT, EUROPEAN PERINATAL HEALTH REPORT, HEALTH AND CARE
OF PREGNANT WOMEN AND BABIES IN EUROPE IN 2010 19 (2010),
http://www.europeristat.com/images/doc/EPHR2010_w_disclaimer.pdf.
43. See id.
44. See id.
45. JUDITH PENCE ROOKS, MIDWIFERY AND CHILDBIRTH IN AMERICA 406 (1997).
46. See id.
47. See MacDorman et al., 2012, supra note 20.
48. See PENCE ROOKS, supra note 45, at 394.
49. See e.g., id. at 401 (explaining that in most European Union countries,
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service, the National Institute for Health Care and Excellence, issued
guidelines in December 2014 advising women that for low-risk
pregnancies, it is safer to give birth in the home or in a birthing center than
in a hospital, due to the lower risk of a medically unnecessary
intervention.50
Finally, the costs associated with childbirth are
considerably lower in countries that integrate midwifery services into
maternal healthcare.51
Healthcare systems that integrate midwifery
services show that these are safe, cost-effective, and provide women with
an alternative to physician-led care during pregnancy and childbirth.
For many women in the United States, unfortunately, choosing to have a
home birth—or even to use the services of a midwife in a hospital birth—is
simply not a meaningful option, as it is in several other developed
countries. Yet increasing interest in home birth over the past decade
reflects an important demand for this option. In light of rising maternal and
infant mortality rates in the United States, it is especially important that
further studies are conducted about midwives’ potential to positively
impact outcomes. It is also important that legislatures, in regulating access
to midwifery, inform their decisions with facts, rather than rely solely on
the discourse of risk.
B. Midwife v. Physician
1.

What Midwives Do

There are several types of midwives that practice in the United States.
These vary in the extent and type of training and education they receive, as
well as in their level of licensure, regulation, or restriction in various states.
This paper discusses three categories of midwives: Certified Nurse
Midwives (CNMs), who obtain a degree in nursing as well as specialized
training in midwifery; Certified Professional Midwives (CPMs), who are
trained and certified by a national organization; and Lay Midwives, who
train primarily by apprenticeship and are regulated by the fewest number of
states—and actually statutorily barred from practicing in ten states and the
District of Columbia.52
midwives play significant roles even in pregnancies with complications).
50. See Katrin Bennhold & Catherine Saint Louis, British Regulator Urges Home
Births Over Hospitals for Uncomplicated Pregnancies, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 3, 2014,
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/04/world/british-regulator-urges-home-births-overhospitals-for-uncomplicated-pregnancies.html?_r=0.
51. See ROBBIE DAVIS-FLOYD, BIRTH MODELS THAT WORK 300 (Robbie E DavisFloyd et al. eds., 2009); PENCE ROOKS, supra note 45, at 386-89.
52. See JENNIFER BLOCK, PUSHED: THE PAINFUL TRUTH ABOUT CHILDBIRTH AND
MODERN MATERNITY CARE 180 (2007) (noting that these states are: Alabama, Illinois,
Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Maryland, Missouri, North Carolina, South Dakota, and
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Arguments for and Against Home Birth

Today, there is debate over the role midwives and physicians should
optimally play in childbirth. Proponents of midwifery argue that midwives
and physicians have different approaches to childbirth.53 Midwives
consider childbirth a normal process. Pregnancy and labor are only a part
of their wider focus; in addition to helping women with the biological
aspects of conception, pregnancy, childbirth, and breastfeeding, midwives
are also concerned with the impact of the birth on others in the household,
the infant’s adjustment to life outside of the womb, and other “social,
cultural, spiritual and ceremonial aspects of pregnancy and childbirth.”54
Women who want to give birth at home or in a birth center, attended by a
midwife, often prefer the comfort of a home or home-like setting. At
home, women have the opportunity to surround themselves with friends
and family during the labor.55 They can also move freely and are able to
eat, drink, or do anything else that would make them more comfortable.56
Supporters of midwifery and home birth are not only concerned with the
benefits of giving birth under the care of a midwife—they also often have
reasons for wanting to avoid hospital birth. Women who give birth in
hospital settings are far more likely to undergo unnecessary medical
interventions, including electronic fetal monitoring, anesthesia, induced
labor, and cesarean section.57
In addition to being costly, these
interventions are often unnecessary for a pregnancy with no complications.
They also have risks of their own, including making additional medical
interventions necessary.58 Cesarean sections, like any other surgery, can be
Wyoming).
53. See e.g., Laura D. Hermer, Midwifery: Strategies on the Road to Universal
Legalization, 13 HEALTH MATRIX 325, 336–37 (2003); Jill Cohen, The Homebirth
TODAY
(2008),
Choice,
MIDWIFERY
http://www.midwiferytoday.com/articles/homebirthchoice.asp#Types.
54. PENCE ROOKS, supra note 45, at 395.
55. See id. at 481-82.
56. See id. at 481.
57. See Kenneth Johnson & Betty-Anne Daviss, Outcomes of Planned Home
Births with Certified Professional Midwives: Large Prospective Study in North
America, 330 BRIT. MED. J. 1416 (2005); NK Lowe, Context and Process of Informed
Consent for Pharmacologic Strategies in Labor Pain Care, 49 J. MIDWIFERY &
WOMEN’S HEALTH 250–59 (2004).
58. The “Cascade effect” is a phenomenon in which one intervention may cause a
need for the next; for example, fetal monitoring can slow labor; an induction
administered to speed up delivery may lead to increased pain; increased pain can lead
to an epidural; an epidural can distress the fetus and make a C-section necessary. See
HENCI GOER, THE THINKING WOMAN’S GUIDE TO A BETTER BIRTH 96 (1999); see also
M. Sara Rosenthal, Socioethical Issues in Hospital Birth: Troubling Tales from a
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risky, and maternal mortality rates are two to six times higher in women
who undergo this procedure; yet during the last decade, rates of cesarean
section reached an all-time high in the United States, at 32 percent of all
births.59 Many advocates of midwifery and home birth point to this as an
example of physician focus on the diagnosis and management of pregnancy
as a pathological process—rather than a normal life event. Other issues
women who give birth in a hospital sometimes face include lack of
informed consent and the feeling that they are not in control of the labor
and delivery.60 While physicians might be motivated by the convenience of
a quick childbirth, the pay that comes from ordering additional medical
tests or procedures, or the fear of liability for anything that could go wrong
during the birth, midwives make an effort to prioritize the pregnant or
laboring woman’s comfort and instincts.
Of course, there are two sides to this argument. Medical groups in the
United States, including the American College of Obstetricians and
Gynecologists (ACOG) and the American Academy of Pediatrics (AAP),
have issued guidelines asserting that childbirth is safest when it takes place
in a hospital, under the care of a physician.61 The American Medical
Association (AMA) has published a resolution asking state legislatures to
pass legislation prohibiting home birth.62 There are many medical
problems that can arise during childbirth—both for the laboring woman
and her fetus or the newborn child.63 Physicians believe that these risks
make hospitals the safest place for labor and delivery. When emergencies
occur, hospitals are equipped to quickly intervene surgically or

Canadian Sample, 49 SOCIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 369, 372 (2006) (“Once the first
intervention is introduced, the laboring woman has the sense that she has lost control of
the experience and that she is at the mercy of the hospital staff.”).
59. See FAY MENACKER & BRADY E. HAMILTON, U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH AND
HUMAN SERVS., RECENT TRENDS IN CESAREAN DELIVERY IN THE UNITED STATES 1
(2010), http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/databriefs/db35.pdf (showing an increase in
Cesarean sections from 21 per 100 births in 1996 to 32 per 100 births in 2007).
60. See e.g., Sarah R. Baker et al., “I Felt as Though I’d Been in Jail”: Women’s
Experiences of Maternity Care During Labour, Delivery and the Immediate
Postpartum, 15 FEMINISM & PSYCHOLOGY 315, 315–42 (2005).
61. See Amie Newman, Bad Medicine: AMA Seeks to Outlaw Home Births, RH
REALITY
CHECK
(June
16,
2008,
3:28
PM),
http://rhrealitycheck.org/article/2008/06/16/bad-medicine-ama-seeks-to-outlaw-homebirths/.
62. Id.
63. See AM. COLL. OF OBSTETRICIANS & GYNECOLOGISTS, COMMITTEE ON
OBSTETRIC PRACTICE, PLANNED HOME BIRTH (2011), https://www.acog.org/Resources_
And_Publications/Committee_Opinions/Committee_on_Obstetric_Practice/Planned_H
ome_Birth [hereinafter ACOG COMMITTEE OPINION].
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pharmaceutically. Moreover, obstetricians are specialists who have years
of medical training.64 Hospital resources and trained personnel minimize
risks and optimize preparation for emergencies.65
Additionally, some proponents of hospital birth cite the costs of an
integrated home birth system as a concern. The costs of maintaining home
birth as a safe and widely available option include the costs of a transfer
system in case of emergencies; personnel, especially where there are
shortages; and the legal costs and care costs associated with injuries or
disabilities incurred by women and children in emergency situations.66
3.

Safety of Home Birth

In addition to continuing debate about the benefits of midwifery care
versus physician care for pregnant and laboring women, there is debate
about the relative safety of home versus hospital births. Several studies of
planned home births67 have shown no increased risk to the woman or
child.68 These have largely taken place in areas ripe for safe transfers or
widespread use of home birth.69 Other studies have shown elevated risks to
babies born at home.70 While there is no consensus among the medical
community whether home birth is as safe—or safer—than hospital birth, it
is noteworthy that the United States has higher infant and maternal
mortality rates than countries that have either higher rates of home birth or
higher rates of births attended by midwives, in addition to physicians.71
64. Id. See also Become an OBGYN: Education Requirements and Career
Information, http://study.com/become_an_obgyn.html (last visited Feb. 26 2016).
65. See ACOG COMMITTEE OPINION, supra note 63.
66. See Kelly Fitzgerald, Home Birth Not As Safe, Cost Effective Or Satisfying As
NEWS
TODAY
(Nov.
13,
2012),
Previously
Reported,
MED.
http://www.medicalnewstoday.com/articles/252753.php.
67. Studies that compare the safety of home births with hospital births, but which
include unplanned home births, may skew statistics and not fully represent the safety of
planned home births. Judith Lothian, Home Birth: The Wave of the Future?, 15 J.
Perinatal Educ. 43, 44 (2006) (citing Benedetti et al., Outcomes of Planned Home
Births in Washington State: 1989-1996, OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 101, 198-200
(2003).
68. See id; Kenneth Johnson & Betty-Anne Daviss, Outcomes of Planned Home
Births with Certified Professional Midwives: Large Prospective Study in North
America, 330 BRIT. MED. J. 1416 (2005); Janssen et al., Outcomes of Planned Home
Births Versus Planned Hospital Births After Regulation of Midwifery in British
Columbia, 166 Can. Med. Ass’n J. 315, 315 (2002); Murray Enkin et al., A GUIDE TO
EFFECTIVE CARE IN PREGNANCY AND CHILDBIRTH 250-51 (3rd ed. 2000).
69. See ACOG COMMITTEE OPINION, supra note 62, at 3 (examining planned
home births in Washington State, the Netherlands, and British Columbia.).
70. Id.
71. See World Factbook, supra note 35; Amnesty International, supra note 36;
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II. HOME BIRTH: LEGAL OBSTACLES TO ACCESS
Several components of the U.S. healthcare system pose potential barriers
to women who wish to give birth at home or in a birthing center—and the
midwives whose services they use. First, state licensure of midwives and
birth centers varies, leaving women with different options for childbirth
depending on their state. Second, insurance plans do not always cover
midwives and birthing centers. Midwives and others who turn to the legal
system in an attempt to overcome these barriers face difficulties there, as
well. This section focuses on how midwives, their clients, and their
prospective clients are affected by these structural barriers to midwifery
access.
A. State Licensure
States have the power to regulate the medical licensing of midwives.
There are several different classifications of midwives, which require
different levels and types of training, and which have various degrees of
recognition and regulation in different states. The primary categories of
midwives are Certified Nurse Midwives, Certified Professional Midwives,
and Lay Midwives.
1.

Certified Nurse Midwives

Certified Nurse Midwives (CNMs) are required to have a nursing degree
and to obtain additional education in midwifery through an accredited
nurse-midwifery program.72 The American College of Nurse Midwives
certifies CNMs,73 and CNMs usually work in hospitals or birth centers.74
Few CNMs assist in home births, because to do so they must collaborate
with a physician.75 CNMs are licensed in all states, but several states only
license CNMs and not other types of midwives.
Connecticut is one example of a state that licenses CNMs but not other
types of midwives.76 In Connecticut, CNMs seeking licensure must hold
current certification by the American College of Nurse Midwives; be

Shapiro, supra note 37.
72. Become
a
Midwife,
A M.
C.
OF
NURSE-MIDWIVES,
http://www.midwife.org/Become-a-Midwife.
73. Id. See also Medline Plus, Certified Nurse-Midwife, NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF
HEALTH/U.S.
NATIONAL
LIBRARY
OF
MEDICINE
(2013),
http://www.nlm.nih.gov/medlineplus/ency/article/002000.htm.
74. Id.
75. Cohen, supra note 53.
76. Midwife Licensure Requirements, Conn. Dep’t OF PUBLIC HEALTH (2015),
http://www.ct.gov/dph/cwp/view.asp?a=3121&q=389420 (last visited Feb. 14, 2016).
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eligible for registered nurse licensure in Connecticut; and have successfully
completed thirty hours of education in pharmacology for nursemidwifery.77 Because Connecticut has no law regulating—or making
illegal—lay midwifery, a woman in Connecticut seeking a home birth may
find and use the services of a lay midwife. She might, however, have
trouble getting an insurance company to cover these services. Insurance
providers are not required to cover the services of unlicensed medical
actors. Moreover, even though Connecticut neither regulates nor restricts
the practice of midwives who are not CNMs, certified professional
midwives and lay midwives remain at risk of prosecution for the unlicensed
practice of nursing or medicine in states that only regulate CNMs.
Although this legal landscape is not ideal for a woman who wishes to use
the services of a midwife but not in a hospital setting, a woman in
Connecticut would face fewer obstacles in pursuit of a home birth than a
woman in a state that has enacted a prohibition on the practice of lay
midwifery.
The practice of lay midwifery is unlawful in eleven
jurisdictions, including the District of Columbia.78 North Carolina is one
such state.79 The only legal option for a woman seeking a home birth in
North Carolina would be to use the services of a CNM under the
supervision of a physician. Statutory bans on midwifery have not entirely
stopped women from choosing to have their babies at home; instead, they
have sent pregnant women and midwives underground.80 Although there
are lay midwives who will break the law in order to assist in home births—
especially when the alternative is a woman giving birth without any
medical assistance—these births may be riskier. It may be more difficult
for a midwife practicing illegally to make the decision to transfer to the
hospital, given her personal stakes in not being detected.81
2.

Certified Professional Midwives
Certified Professional Midwives (CPMs) are certified by the North

77.
78.
79.
80.

Id.
See Block, supra note 52, at 180.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-178.3 (2015).
Sara Patterson, Underground Midwives Flout N.C. Law to Give Moms-to-be
LOAFING
(Jan.
8,
2014),
More
Choices,
CREATIVE
http://clclt.com/charlotte/underground-midwives-flout-nc-law-to-give-moms-to-bemore-choices/Content?oid=3298788.
81. Id. (“Every time a midwife is working illegally, there is going to be hesitation
about going to a hospital if it becomes necessary,’ says Joelle Ceremy, a certified
midwife who is licensed to attend home births in South Carolina. ‘Most of these
women have kids themselves, so they’re concerned about their own freedom.”).
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American Registry of Midwives (NARM).82 To qualify for certification,
CPMs train through a combination of education and supervised clinical
experience.83 CPMs can only work legally in states that recognize and
regulate their profession. About half of the states regulate CPMs through
requiring licensure, certification, or registration with the state.84 CPMs
usually work in birth centers and/or in the home setting.85 California is one
example of a state that licenses CPMs. In California, CPMs may apply for
California midwifery licensure after passing NARM training and
certification examination.86
3.

Lay Midwives

A final group of midwives are known as lay midwives.87 Compared with
CNMs and CPMs, lay midwives generally have less formal training.88 Lay
midwives generally learn necessary skills through apprenticing with more
experienced midwives and assist in home births.89 States regulate lay
midwifery to various degrees. About half of the states neither regulate nor
prohibit lay midwifery. Lay midwifery is unlawful in ten states and the
District of Columbia.90 Several states explicitly permit lay midwives to
practice and have laws regulating aspects of the practice.91 For example,
the Arkansas “Licensed Lay Midwife Act” authorized the Arkansas
Department of Health to create rules and regulations for the licensing of lay
midwives who wish to practice in the state.92 The Department of Health
then created guidelines detailing safety protocols for antepartum, intrapartum, postpartum, and newborn care, as well as requirements for
82. How to Become a CPM, NORTH AMERICAN REGISTRY OF MIDWIVES,
http://narm.org/certification/how-to-become-a-cpm/ (last updated 2016).
83. Id.
84. See CPMS LEGAL STATUS BY STATE, THE BIG PUSH FOR MIDWIVES,
http://pushformidwives.nationbuilder.com/cpms_legal_status_by_state (last visited
Feb. 17, 2016).
85. Medline Plus, supra note 73.
86. See Midwives Application for Licensure, THE MED. BOARD OF CAL.,
http://www.mbc.ca.gov/Applicants/Midwives/ (last visited Feb. 14, 2016).
87. Lay midwives are also known as “direct entry” midwives. Cohen, supra note
53.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. See BLOCK, supra note 51, at 180.
91. Donna M. Peizer, A Social and Legal Analysis of the Independent Practice of
Midwifery: Vicarious Liability of the Collaborating Physician and Judicial Means of
Addressing Denial of Hospital Privileges, 2 BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J. 139, 176 (2013),
http://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1012&context=bglj.
92. Licensed Lay Midwife Act, Ark. Code Ann.§ 17-85-101 (1987).
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emergency situations and transfers.93
Because most states do not regulate lay midwifery—and some states
even prohibit it—most women in the United States who desire a home birth
may face uncertainty when seeking and financing midwifery services.
4.

Birth Centers

Birth centers, defined by the American Public Health Association as
“Any health facility, place, or institution which is not a hospital or in a
hospital and where births are planned to occur away from the mother’s
usual residence following normal, uncomplicated pregnancy,”94 are
increasingly being used by women who do not wish to give birth at a
hospital—but also do not want to give birth at home.95 They are often
designed to be home-like facilities. The American Association of Birth
Centers, which advocates for increased access to and use of these facilities,
states that birth centers are guided by “prevention, sensitivity, safety,
appropriate medical intervention, and cost effectiveness.”96 At birth
centers, women are cared for by midwives, with the possibility of transfer
to a hospital.97
Birth Centers are licensed in forty-one states and operate in eight states
that do not license them.98 This means that most women can theoretically
use a birth center if they choose to; however, insurance coverage can
provide a barrier to access. Fifteen percent of women who use birth centers
use a form of self payment; about 50 percent use private insurance; 24
93. See generally, Rules and Regulations for Governing the Practice of Lay
BOARD OF HEALTH (Apr. 2007),
Midwifery in Arkansas, ARK. STATE
http://www.healthy.arkansas.gov/aboutadh/rulesregs/laymidwifery.pdf.
94. Guidelines for Licensing and Regulating Birth Centers, AMERICAN PUB.
HEALTH ASS’N, http://www.apha.org/policies-and-advocacy/public-health-policystatements/policy-database/2014/07/10/13/29/guidelines-for-licensing-and-regulatingbirth-centers (last visited Feb. 25, 2016).
95. MacDorman et al., 2014, supra note 1, at 2 (finding that, like home births,
birth center births have been rising since 2004 but continue to constitute fewer than 0.5
percent of all U.S. births).
96. What is a Birth Center?, AM. ASS’N OF BIRTH CTRS. (2014),
http://www.birthcenters.org/?page=bce_what_is_a_bc (last visited Feb. 13, 2016).
97. Birth
Center Results, AM. ASS’N OF BIRTH CTRS. (2010),
https://web.archive.org/web/20130702233946/http://www.birthcenters.org/open-abirth-center/birth-center-experience/birth-center-results.
98. See Letter from Am. Ass’n of Birth Ctrs. to Mr. Donald S. Clark, Sec’y, FTC 2
(Apr.
30,
2014)
(on
file
with
Federal
Trade
Commission),
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_comments/2014/04/0017190023.pdf.
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percent use Medicaid; 2 percent use Medicare; and 3 percent have military
coverage.99
B. Insurance Coverage
Insurance providers in the United States vary in coverage of midwifery
services and birth centers, but legislative changes over the last several years
suggest that providers are moving in the direction of greater coverage.
The ACA mandated Medicare coverage for licensed midwives and birth
centers.100 It also prohibited private insurance providers that participate in
the Healthcare Marketplace from discriminating against licensed providers,
including midwives.101 Medicare has covered midwifery services and birth
center births in accordance with state licensure for more than two decades,
but the ACA also made positive changes to Medicare coverage by
increasing reimbursement for CNMs.102
Women who are seeking
midwifery services states that prohibit or do not license CPMs, lay
midwives, and/or birth centers, continue to face obstacles to paying for
such services.
C. Legal Obstacles
A variety of circumstances have led midwives to bring legal action
defending their right to practice—these have included situations in which
midwives were protesting state laws prohibiting midwives from practicing
outside of the scope of state licensure103 or were disciplined for practicing
without a license or enjoined from such practice.104
There have been many cases in which midwives have put forward
constitutional arguments that state statutes restricting or regulating
midwifery, or state action disciplining midwives for practicing outside the
99. Rebecca Dekker, New Evidence Confirms Birth Centers Provide Top-Notch
A M.
ASS’N
OF
BIRTH
CTRS.
(Jan.
31,
2013),
Care,
http://www.birthcenters.org/?page=NBCSII.
100. Payment for Certified Nurse-Midwife (CNM) Services, CTR. FOR MEDICARE &
MEDICAID
SERVS.
(Dec.
7,
2012),
http://www.cms.gov/Outreach-andEducation/Medicare-Learning-NetworkMLN/MLNMattersArticles/downloads/mm7005.pdf.
101. Amy N. Moore, ACA Prohibits Discrimination Against Licensed Providers,
Inside
Compensation
(July
31,
2014),
https://www.insidecompensation.com/2014/07/31/aca-prohibits-discrimination-againstlicensed-providers/.
102. See Payment for Certified Nurse-Midwife, supra note 100.
103. See Lange-Kessler v. Dep’t of Educ. of the State of N.Y., 109 F.3d 137, 139
(2d Cir. 1997).
104. E.g., Leigh v. Bd. of Registration in Nursing, 481 N.E.2d 1347, 1349 (Mass.
1985); People ex rel. Sherman v. Cryns, 786 N.E.2d 139, 144 (Ill. 2003).
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scope of state licensure, violate midwives and pregnant women’s due
process and equal protection rights.105 Largely, these arguments have been
unsuccessful in court. No U.S. court has held that the decision where to
give birth is encompassed by the right to privacy, which is considered a
fundamental right under the Constitution.106 Instead, courts have tended to
rely on the framework laid out in Roe v. Wade and its progeny.107 In Roe,
the Supreme Court recognized that at the point of viability, the State has a
legitimate interest in the life of the fetus.108 The Massachusetts Supreme
Court, in validating a statutory scheme in which CNMs were licensed,
while lay midwives were not, declared that statutes requiring midwives to
be licensed according to state law are “adopted precisely to protect this
interest [in the health and safety of the fetus and woman].”109 Other courts
have similarly found that the right of privacy, while encompassing some
reproductive and procreative choices, does not include the choice to give
birth at home with the assistance of an unlicensed midwife.110 Because
midwives have not successfully argued that the ability to choose the
circumstances of birth should be encompassed as a fundamental privacy
right, their constitutional arguments have been limited.
In determining whether state action that does not impinge upon a
fundamental right violates the Fourteenth Amendment, a court looks to
whether there is a “rational basis” for the state action.111 If there is a
rational basis for the state action, a court will not find that it
unconstitutional. Constitutional claims by midwives that challenge state
licensure schemes which exclude midwives, or disciplinary action toward a
midwife who has acted outside of such licensure, generally have not been
successful because of state interests in protecting the health of women and
children. The Second and Third Circuits have both issued such rulings in
denying due process claims;112 as the Third Circuit explained, a training

105. E.g., Lange-Kessler, 109 F.3d at 139; Leigh, 481 N.E.2d at 1349.
106. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965) (finding a

fundamental right to privacy in marital relationships); see also Lawrence v. Texas, 539
U.S. 558, 564-66 (extending the right to privacy to consensual, homosexual activity).
107. See generally Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
108. Id. at 163.
109. Leigh v. Bd. of Registration in Nursing, 506 N.E.2d 91, 93-94. (Mass. 1987).
110. E.g., Sammon v. N.J. Bd. of Med. Exam’rs, 66 F.3d 639, 645 (3d Cir. 1995);
People v. Rosburg, 805 P.2d 432, 437 (Colo. 1991); State v. Kimpel, 665 So.2d 990,
994 (Ala. Ct. App. 1995); Bowland v. Mun. Court, 556 P.2d 1081, 1088-89 (Cal.
1976); Hunter v. Maryland, 676 A.2d 968, 975 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1996).
111. See generally United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
112. See Lange-Kessler v. Dep’t of Educ. of the State of N.Y., 109 F.3d 137, 141
(2d Cir. 1997); Sammon, 66 F.3d at 645.
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requirement was not irrational “given [State] interests in both the technical
competence of the entire population of midwives and the health of the
entire population of midwife consumers,”113 and adding that “it is for the
legislature, not the courts, to balance the advantages and disadvantages of
the . . . requirement.”114 Equal Protection arguments have been defeated
under the same rational basis analyses.115
Midwives have also brought legal challenges to midwifery restriction
under the Sherman Act, which provides, “[e]very contract, combination . . .
or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several
States . . . is declared to be illegal.” 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982). However, courts
have held that several actions, including state licensure of midwives,116 the
restriction of midwifery practice to licensed facilities,117 and physicians
acting with hospitals to limit the admitting privileges of midwives,118 do
not constitute restraint of trade.119
D. Section 2706(a) of the ACA and Access to Midwifery
Section 2706(a) of the ACA, which prohibits private insurers from
extending coverage to licensed providers, went into effect in 2014. While
the statute’s protection is limited to midwives who are acting within the
scope of state licensure, it provides a cause of action for licensed midwives
and patients when health insurance companies refuse to cover midwifery
services. For CNMs and their patients, the law is likely to significantly
expand access to midwifery services to those who cannot afford to pay outof-pocket.
Prior to the passage of the ACA, only thirty-three states had laws in
113. Sammon, 66 F.3d at 646.
114. Id. (citing Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 483

(1955)).
115. E.g., Rosburg, 805 P.2d at 439 (explaining that the classification of licensed
nurse-midwives versus lay midwives is rational and reasonable. Testimony at trial
revealed that nurse-midwives practicing in Colorado are required to be registered
nurses, must have an additional year of midwifery training and also must participate in
continuing education. The state’s expert in pediatrics and obstetrics testified that the
state’s certification of nurse-midwives and prohibition of lay midwifery was ‘very
reasonable and rational.’).
116. Leigh v. Bd. of Registration, 506 N.E.2d 91, 94 (Mass. 1987).
117. Id.
118. Nurse Midwifery Assocs. v. Hibbett, 918 F.2d 605, 614 (6th Cir. 1991)
(“With respect to the allegations that HCH and SHH conspired with their respective
medical staffs, for the reasons stated above, we conclude that the members of the
medical staff were acting as agents of the hospital and that, therefore, the intracorporate
conspiracy doctrine is controlling.”).
119. Leigh, 506 N.E.2d at 94.
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place requiring private insurers to cover midwifery services, and insurers
were only required to reimburse CNMs for all maternity services in fifteen
states.120 One study of eighteen private insurers found that the majority of
insurers sampled did not offer coverage of midwifery and noted that the
factors that made insurers most likely to cover complimentary or
alternative medical care were “consumer interest, demonstrable clinical
efficacy, and state mandates.”121 A 1992 study found that less than 20
percent of total payments to CNMs derived from commercial insurance
companies.122 In 2013, in response to a New York Times article on the
costliness of childbirth in the United States, dozens of women penned
frustrated responses, which detailed stories of private insurance companies
refusing to cover midwife care.123 One woman described her insurer’s
refusal to pay for medical care in a birth center, which was cheaper than a
hospital birth, and noted, “If I had used a medical doctor, medications and
had a C-section with a hospital stay of one week, my coverage would have
been 100 percent.”124
If CNMs or other midwives licensed by state statute are discriminated
against by an Section 2706(a) of the ACA, they now have the right to state
enforcement in accordance with guidelines set out by the state; if the state
does not enforce the law, enforcement falls to the U.S. Department of
Health and Human Services (HHS).125 Unfortunately, § 2706(a) does not
help—and may even hurt—women seeking the services of unlicensed
midwives. While the ACA contains several provisions that are friendly to
unlicensed providers of complimentary and alternative medicine (CAM)126
120. See Elizabeth Rosenthal, Getting Insurance to Pay for Midwives, N.Y. TIMES,
July 3, 2013, http://well.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/07/03/getting-insurance-to-pay-formidwives/?_r=0; E.R. Declercq et al., State Regulation, Payment Policies, and NurseMidwife Services, 17 HEALTH AFF. 2, 193 (1998).
121. Kenneth R. Pelletier et al., Current Trends in the Integration and
Reimbursement of Complementary and Alternative Medicine by Managed Care,
Insurance Carriers, and Hospital Providers. 12(2) AMERICAN J. HEALTH PROMOTION
112, 122 (1997).
122. Anne Scupholme et al, Nurse-Midwifery Care to Vulnerable Populations
Phase I: Demographic Characteristics of the National CNM Sample, 37(5) J. NURSE
MIDWIFERY 341, 345 (1992).
123. Rosenthal, supra note 120.
124. Id.
125. 42 U.S.C. § 18041 (2012).
126. 42 U.S.C. § 256a-1 (2012) (“The Secretary of Health and Human Services
[. . .] shall establish a program to provide grants to or enter into contracts with eligible
entities to establish community-based interdisciplinary, interprofessional teams
(referred to in this section as “health teams”) to support primary care practices,
including obstetrics and gynecology practices, within the hospital service areas served
by the eligible entities.”).
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and even establishes interprofessional health teams127, the exclusive
language of § 2706(a) allows insurers to deny coverage to any unlicensed
professional. Moreover, it may incentivize state legislatures to repeal
current licensure of midwives, or refuse to establish new licensure
provisions, and thus avoid reimbursing midwives at 100 percent of the rate
of their fee, which is now required for Medicare and Medicaid
reimbursements.
III. HOSPITAL BIRTH AND THE LAW: LEGAL OBSTACLES TO REMEDIES
A. Background
The previous section explained the structural and legal barriers that
prevent women from choosing to use a midwife or give birth at home. This
section explores issues that can occur in hospital births, where physicians
often balance the woman’s interests and rights against risk to the fetus,
regardless of whether such balancing is lawful. Physicians sometimes
prioritize the wellbeing of the fetus over the wellbeing of the woman, or
her decisions about her medical care, and perform forced medical
interventions or do not provide the requisite informed consent. When
subjected to such mistreatment by the physician—or even other forms of
misconduct, such as emotional abuse during labor—women often face legal
barriers to recourse. When the labor and delivery result in a healthy baby,
judges and juries, and accordingly, lawyers, are unlikely to view physician
transgressions as yielding significant, if any, damages.
A recent example that has been discussed in the media is the case of
“Kelly,” a California woman whose forced episiotomy was caught on video

127. See Louis Jacobson, Did the Health Care Law Give ‘Elevated Legitimacy’ to
PUNDITFACT,
Feb.
24,
2015,
Alternative
Medicine?,
POLITIFACT:
http://www.politifact.com/punditfact/statements/2015/feb/24/jonah-goldberg/did-acagive-elevated-legitimacy-alternative-medic/ (noting that the following provisions of the
ACA create legitimacy for non-licensed providers of alternative treatments: Section
4001, which ”establishes the National Prevention, Health Promotion and Public Health
Council and, in turn, an advisory group on prevention, health promotion, and
integrative and public health issues”; Section 4206, which “creates a pilot program to
provide at-risk individuals who use community health centers with ‘individualized
wellness plans’ designed to reduce risk factors for preventable conditions, including
integrative health techniques”; Section 5101, which “creates a National Healthcare
Workforce Commission and expands the definition of the health care workforce to
include integrative health care practitioner, licensed complementary and alternative
medicine provider, and doctors of chiropractic”; and Section 6301, which “establishes
the Patient-Centered Outcomes Research Institute to fund research that determines
which medical techniques work best, [. . .] funding studies of ‘relaxation and
mindfulness exercises,’ massage, yoga, meditation, and breathing exercises.”).
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and who has been unable to find a lawyer to represent her.128 Kelly and
advocacy organizations working on her behalf have spread Kelly’s story
and raised over $6,000 to cover Kelly’s legal costs.129 In the video of
Kelly’s birth, after the baby crowns, the doctor states that he will perform
an episiotomy.130 Kelly has only pushed once at this point and repeatedly
says, “No.” The nurse tells Kelly she will not feel it; the doctor maintains
he is preventing a possible tear.131 There is no evidence that Kelly’s baby
was in distress, or that the episiotomy was medically necessary.132 In
response to Kelly’s protests, the doctor states, “Listen. I am the expert here.
[. . .] You can go home and do it. You go to Kentucky.”133 He then
performs the episiotomy, without consent.134
In 2013, Lynn Paltrow and Jeanne Flavin reported the results of a thirtytwo year study of pregnant women who were forcibly confined or given
medical treatment.135 The report details more than 400 cases in which
pregnancy “was a necessary factor leading to attempted and actual
deprivations of a woman’s physical liberty.”136 The original study
examined cases beginning in 1973, the year Roe v. Wade was decided, and
ending in 2005.137 In a follow-up article, Paltrow and Flavin observed that
there has been a significant increase in the frequency of these cases since
2005 with 380 identified between 2005 and 2014.138 Many of these cases
involved forced transfer to and confinement at the hospital, and several
involved forced medical procedures, including cesarean section.139
Emotional abuse at the hands of medical staff can also be a problem for

128. Forced Episiotomy: Kelly’s Story, Human Rights in Childbirth, (Aug. 27,
2014), http://www.humanrightsinchildbirth.org/kellys-story/ [hereinafter Kelly’s Story].
129. IMPROVING
BIRTH’S
FUNDRAISER,
CROWDRISE,
https://www.crowdrise.com/kellygoestocourt/fundraiser/improvingbirth (last visited
Feb. 27, 2016).
130. Kelly’s Story, supra note 128.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Lynn M. Paltrow & Jeanne Flavin, Arrests of and Forced Interventions on
Pregnant Women in the United States, 1973–2005: Implications for Women’s Legal
Status and Public Health, 38 J. OF HEALTH POL., POL’Y AND LAW, 299, 299 (2013).
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. See Lynn M. Paltrow & Jeanne Flavin, Pregnant, and No Civil Rights, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 7, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/08/opinion/pregnant-and-nocivil-rights.html?_r=0.
139. See Paltrow & Flavin, supra note 135, at 299.
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women in childbirth. In 2014, Catherine Skol received a verdict of 1.4
million dollars from the Chicago hospital where she gave birth in 2008.140
During Skol’s childbirth, her obstetrician, Dr. Scott Pierce, denied Skol
pain medication and told her, “Pain is the best teacher”; refused to answer
her questions; told her, “Shut up, close your mouth, and push”; artificially
ruptured the membrane in order to induce her water to break without
consent; and told a nurse, who attempted to show Skol the Fetal Heart
Monitor, “No, do not help her.”141 After the delivery, Dr. Pierce refused to
allow either Skol or her husband to hold the baby.142
Although Skol was successful in bringing charges against the physician
in her case, women who experience abuse or other violations during
childbirth may not think they have recourse—especially if they and their
baby are healthy afterward. Yet there are severe consequences of trauma
during childbirth—and trauma during childbirth may be more common
than discourse would suggest. Research has found that between 1.5 and 6
percent of women suffer symptoms of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder
(PTSD) following childbirth.143 One study has suggested a correlation
between PTSD and high levels of medical intervention.144 The women
interviewed described their childbirth experiences as making them feel
“powerless,” and “stripped of their dignity.”145
Informed consent is another important issue in hospital births, and the
extent of informed consent established may impact whether unwelcome
medical interventions occur during birth and whether a woman experiences
140. See Roy Strom, Kathleen Zellner: The Rescuer, CHI. LAWYER, (Dec. 1 2014),
http://chicagolawyermagazine.com/Archives/2014/12/Kathleen-Zellner.aspx; see also
Skol v. Pierce, The Verdict, JOURNEY TO A BETTER BIRTH (Feb. 1, 2014),
https://partusmelior.wordpress.com/2014/02/01/skol-v-pierce-the-verdict/.
141. Lawsuit Details Painful Delivery, CHI. TRIBUNE, (Dec. 16, 2008),
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2008-12-16/news/0812160129_1_suit-pain-hospital.
142. Id.
143. Cheryl Tatano Beck, Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder Due to Childbirth, 53
RES.
216,
217
(2004),
NURSING
https://www.elpartoesnuestro.es/sites/default/files/public/documentos/posparto/PTSD.p
df; see also Clare Goldwin, Libby Didn’t Know Whether her Newborn Baby was Alive
for SIX HOURS and Needs Post-traumatic Stress Counselling Over the Birth
Experience . . . So What IS Going Wrong in Britain’s Labour Wards?, DAILY MAIL
(Jan. 30, 2013),
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/femail/article-2270941/Birth-traumaLibby-ORourke-Toni-Harman-Julie-Hainsworth-traumatic-labours-Britains-hospitalwards.html (referencing a study from Tel Aviv University that found that one in three
women who give birth experience symptoms of PTSD); I. Shlomi Polachek et al.,
Postpartum Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder Symptoms, ISRAEL MEDICAL ASS’N
JOURNAL, 347, 347-53 (2012).
144. Beck, supra note 143, at 217.
145. Id.
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feelings of powerlessness or frustration during and following the birth.
Federal regulations and professional guidelines state pregnant women’s
right to accurate and comprehensible information.146 There are many
benefits that stem from women participating in their maternity care
decisions and feeling in control of the birth, including increased patient
satisfaction,147 shorter recovery periods,148 fewer post traumatic stress
symptoms after the childbirth,149 and increased levels of bonding between
the woman and newborn child.150 Comprehensible informed consent may
be lacking in many childbirths, however. Studies of first-time mothers
show that they often walk away from their birth without having understood
the risks of common procedures, such as induction and cesarean section.151
While 75 percent reported knowing they had the right to refuse treatment,
18 percent of women who had episiotomies reported no participation in

146. See generally Holly Goldberg, Informed Decision Making in Maternity Care,
PERINATAL
EDUC.
32,
32–40
(2009),
18(1)
J.
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2667301/#bib25; see also The Patient
Care Partnership,
A M.
HOSP.
ASS’N
(2003),
http://www.aha.org/advocacyTHE
AMERICAN
COLLEGE
OF
issues/communicatingpts/pt-care-partnership.shtml;
OBSTETRICIANS
AND
GYNECOLOGISTS,
IINFORMED
CCONSENT
(2009),
http://www.acog.org/Resources-And-Publications/Committee-Opinions/Committee-onEthics/Informed-Consent.
147. See Wendy Christiaens & Piet Bracke, Assessment of Social Psychological
Determinants of Satisfaction with Childbirth in a Cross-National Perspective, 7 BMC
PREGNANCY AND CHILDBIRTH, 26 (OCT. 2007); Josephine M. Green & Helen A. Baston,
Feeling in Control During Labor: Concepts, Correlates, and Consequences, 30 BIRTH,
235-47 (Dec. 30, 2003), http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/14992154.
148. Green & Baston, supra note 147, at 235.
149. See Julie J. Jomeen, The Importance of Assessing Psychological Status During
Pregnancy, Childbirth and the Postnatal Period as a Multidimensional Construct: A
Literature Review, 8 CLINICAL EFFECTIVENESS IN NURSING 143, 143–55 (2004).
150. J.M. Green et al., Expectations, Experiences, and Psychological Outcomes of
Childbirth: A Prospective Study of 825 Women, 17(1) BIRTH 15, 15–24 (1990).
151. EUGENE R. DECLERCQ ET AL., LISTENING TO MOTHERS II: REPORT OF THE
SECOND NATIONAL U.S. SURVEY OF WOMEN’S CHILDBEARING EXPERIENCES 1, 6
(2006), http://www.childbirthconnection.org/pdfs/LTMII_report.pdf.; see also Jennifer
M. Torres & Raymond G. De Vries, Birthing Ethics: What Mothers, Families,
Childbirth Educators, Nurses, and Physicians Should Know About the Ethics of
Childbirth,
18
J.
PERINATAL
EDUC.
12,
18
(2009),
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2667293/ (“Inundating parents with
pages of information, standardized and presented in medical and statistical terms
unfamiliar to laypeople, may meet the letter of the ethical requirement to respect
autonomy, but it fails to provide the knowledge parents need to make an informed
choice.”).
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making the decision.152
There are many components of hospital-based maternity care that can
lead to traumatic outcomes for women, even when ultimately, both the
woman and the baby are healthy. Part III discusses legal recourses for
these women and explains how they are often inadequate.
Physicians and medical staff who perform medical interventions or
procedures against a woman’s will generally have a variety of reasons. On
one end of the spectrum are interventions that the physician deems
necessary for the survival of the woman and/or the fetus. On the other end
of the spectrum are interventions performed where there is no significant
risk to either the woman or the fetus—perhaps performed for convenience
or for physician preference. In the middle of the spectrum are procedures
that may or may not improve the wellbeing of the woman and fetus.
B. Legal Barriers: Constitutional Law
The right to self-determination in medical treatment is an important
aspect of autonomy.153 Two rights typically fall under this umbrella: the
right to informed consent and a corollary right to refuse medical treatment.
Both state common law and the U.S. Constitution provide a basis for these
rights.154 Although there are limited exceptions to the right to refuse
medical treatment, including state interest in the protection of life and state
interest in the protection of third parties,155 a state generally cannot compel
medical treatment of one individual to benefit or even save the life of a
third party.156 Yet courts have routinely found it lawful to compel medical

152. DECLERCQ, supra note 151, at 6-7.
153. Margo Kaplan, “A Special Class of Persons”: Pregnant Women’s Right to

Refuse Medical Treatment After Gonzales v. Carhart, 13 U. PA. J. CONST. LAW 145,
163 (2010); see also Reva B. Siegel, Dignity and the Politics of Protection: Abortion
Restrictions under Casey/Carhart, 117 YALE L.J. 1694, 1754-56 (2008).
154. See Cruzan ex rel. Cruzan v. Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278 (1990)
(finding a Constitutional right to refuse medical treatment: “The Fourteenth
Amendment provides that no State shall ‘deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law.’ The principle that a competent person has a
constitutionally protected liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical treatment may
be inferred from our prior decisions”; and noting the state interests that may override a
patient’s right to refuse treatment at common law: the prevention of suicide; the
preservation of life; the protection of third parties; and the preservation of the ethical
integrity of the medical profession).
155. Id. at 271.
156. See generally McFall v. Shimp, No. GD78-17711, 1978 Pa. Dist. & Cnty.
LEXIS 70, at *71 (C.P. of Allegheny Cty. Jul. 26, 1978) (refusing to order one man to
donate bone marrow to save the life of his cousin).
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treatment in the case of pregnant women.157 In doing so, they have
typically cited Roe and its discussion of state interests in fetal life. It is
unclear whether these cases point to an additional exception to the common
law right to refuse medical treatment—the state’s interest in protecting fetal
life—or whether they extend state interests in preserving life and protecting
third parties to potential life.158
Orders to compel medical treatment have generally been upheld only in
circumstances in which the procedures would protect the life of both the
viable fetus and the pregnant woman.159 This is in line with the emphasis
on women’s health in Roe, which created an exception to state’s ability to
proscribe abortion in the third trimester if the pregnancy or childbirth
would endanger the life of the woman. Importantly, decisions overturning
court orders have come too late for some women—a particularly tragic case
is In re A.C., in which doctors received a court order to perform a cesarean
section on a terminally ill woman in her twenty-sixth week of pregnancy.
The surgery resulted in the death of both the preterm child and the
woman.160
Although women have succeeded in challenging compelled medical
treatment, especially when it would only benefit the fetus, they have also
failed. Several factors contribute to the continuing precariousness of
157. See, e.g., In re Madyun Fetus, 114 Daily Wash. L. Rep. 2233, 2240 (D.C.
Super. Ct. 1986) (finding that a state can override a patient’s religious reasons for
refusing a Cesarean section); Pemberton v. Tallahassee Mem’l Reg’l Med. Ctr., 66 F.
Supp. 2d 1247, 1252-53 (N.D. Fla. 1999) (finding that a risk of uterine rupture of
between two and 6 percent constituted an unacceptable risk to a fetus and warranted an
order compelling a pregnant woman to submit to a cesarean section); Jefferson v.
Griffin Spalding Cnty. Hospital, 274 S.E.2d 457, 460 (Ga. 1981) (ordering a pregnant
woman to submit to a sonogram and cesarean section); In re Jamaica Hospital, 491
N.Y.S.2d 898, 899 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Spec. Term 1985) (ordering a pregnant woman to
submit to a blood transfusion and acknowledging that the pregnancy was the reason for
intervening).
158. Kaplan, supra note 153, at 167; Eric M. Levine, Comment, The
Constitutionality of Court-Ordered Cesarean Surgery: A Threshold Question, 4 ALB.
L.J. SCI. & TECH. 229, 278-87 (1994).
159. In cases involving a fetus that was not viable, or where the medical treatment
would risk the life or health of the woman carrying the fetus, courts have refused to
issue or overturned court orders compelling medical treatment. See In re A.C., 573
A.2d 1235, 1235 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (overturning a court order of a cesarean section that
increased the chances of survival of the fetus but would be dangerous to the woman);
In re Baby Boy Doe, 632 N.E.2d 326, 326 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994) (refusing to order a
Cesarean section for the “sole benefit” of the fetus because the surgery would increase
risk to the woman’s health and increase her recovery time); Taft v. Taft, 446 N.E.2d
395, 395 (Mass. 1983) (refusing to order a procedure in the second trimester that
would improve the chances of survival for the fetus).
160. See Paltrow & Flavin, supra note 135, at 319.
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pregnant women’s right to refuse medical treatment. The determination of
whether a procedure or lack thereof poses risk to the woman or fetus is
often uncertain.161 Questions remain as to what constitutes a woman’s
“health,” and whether this encompasses physical health; psychological
health; future psychological health; survival, simply; or a combination of
these.162 One scholar has argued that recent abortion jurisprudence has
abandoned the primacy of women’s health and will potentially pave the
way for courts to compel medical treatment of pregnant women where
treatment would benefit the fetus, regardless of whether it would benefit
the health of the woman.163
Interestingly, Roe and its progeny did not explicitly extend the state
interest in fetal life to any context other than proscribing abortion. Because
courts have routinely used these cases to analyze the constitutionality of
forced medical interventions, it is unlikely that there will be a significant
backslide; indeed, recent decisions such as Gonzales v. Carhart and an
upswing in legislative attempts to restrict abortion164 threaten to continue to
strip away at women’s right to refuse medical treatment during pregnancy.
Medical professionals and the judiciary, in determining these cases, should
continue to emphasize the importance of the woman’s health laid out in
Roe. Moreover, when analyzing the health of the woman, decision-makers
should look to a more expansive analysis of health that also includes the
woman’s psychological health and well-being at the time of the prospective
medical intervention. Federal legislation tailored to the right to refuse
161. See Kaplan, supra note 153, at 170.
162. Id. at 171-72 (“Roe provides that, while the state’s compelling interest in fetal

life allows it to proscribe abortion in the third trimester, it may not proscribe abortion
when doing so would endanger the life or health of the mother. Health must be broadly
construed, encompassing not only physical well-being, but also psychological and
emotional well-being. Even after viability, when a state’s interest in fetal life becomes
“compelling,” states may not pursue this interest at the expense of a woman’s health. In
subsequent cases, the Court has reaffirmed that the state cannot sacrifice maternal
health for the sake of preserving fetal life.”).
163. See id. at 176-77 (explaining that “in medial treatment cases, the state’s
interest in fetal life is not as compelling as in abortion cases: such treatment cases
involve risk to the fetus’s life or health, but not the termination of fetal life at issue in
abortion,” and suggesting: “Fetal life is implicated far more in these cases than in
Carhart, which concerned the method of abortion rather than whether a fetus would be
aborted. Courts may determine that, if the state’s interest in fetal life justifies state
intrusion into women’s medical decisions in Carhart, it is an even stronger justification
for intrusion into the medical treatment decisions in cases where there is evidence that a
fetus may live or die depending on a chosen course of medical treatment.”).
164. See Paltrow, supra note 138 (noting that an increase in forced interventions on
pregnant women has coincided with a “‘seismic shift’ in the number of states with laws
hostile to abortion rights.”).

Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2015

27

Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law, Vol. 24, Iss. 3 [2015], Art. 1

364

JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY & THE LAW

[Vol. 24:3

medical treatment in pregnancy would best outline such guidelines. Part
III(d) explores how the ACA’s prohibition on discrimination strengthens
the public policy argument that pregnant women have the same rights as
people who are not pregnant and is a step in the right direction for
protecting the right to refuse treatment.
C. Legal Barriers: Tort Law
Women continue to have tort remedies available to them as a recourse
for tortious acts, including negligence and intentional infliction of
emotional distress, that occur during childbirth. While tort claims are
common in cases of fetal harms or injury to the fetus, women rarely sue for
personal harms.165 This is possibly due to low dollar value even for claims
of physical harm, for example an unwanted cesarean section.166 Cultural
expectations that motherhood is an exclusively joyous occasion also may
dilute women’s willingness to pursue claims of negligence or emotional
distress connected with the childbirth.167 A 2010 study on cruelty in
maternity wards relays more than a dozen stories of emotional abuse
inflicted by medical staff during childbirth and notes:
“Women, of course, could complain afterwards—and some do—but
most abuse victims are likely to be recovering from surgery, and all have
a newborn to care for. Traumatized women [must] cope with their
symptoms and function as new mothers. Few [. . .] have the physical or
emotional energy to do other than try to put events behind them and
carry on. For those who do complain, the system that predisposed to
168
abuse in the first place ensures that complaints will fall on deaf ears.”

Indeed, when women do bring malpractice claims for maternal harms,
courts often “villainize” maternal conduct, finding that factors like the
woman’s age, weight, health, and sexual history impact the physician’s
liability.169 When women prevail on malpractice claims encompassing
165. Jamie R. Abrams, Distorted and Diminished Tort Claims for Women, 34
CARDOZO L. REV. 1955, 1979 (2013).
166. Id.; see also Clarke T. Edwards, The Impact of a No-Fault Tort Reform on
Physician Decision-Making: A Look at Virginia’s Birth Injury Program, 80 REV.
JURID. U.P.R. 285, 291 (2011) (explaining that the injuries of a forced cesarean section
include the cost of the procedure and the extended recovery time).
167. Abrams, supra note 165, at 1980.
168. Henci Goer, Cruelty in Maternity Wards: Fifty Years Later, 19 J. PERINATAL
EDUC. 33, 42 (2010), http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2920649/.
169. Abrams, supra note 165, at 1982 (offering examples of such cases, including
White v. Edison, 361 So. 2d 1292, 1294, 1296 (La. Ct. App. 1978) (which emphasized
that the woman was “exceptionally young” and suggested that her abscesses might
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their own physical and emotional injuries, these claims often accompany
fetal harm claims.170 A myriad of factors explains a comparative absence
of maternal malpractice claims, including women not feeling like they can
bring claims, not wanting to bring claims, or being unable to find lawyers
to take their claims to court, where damages may not be significant. The
following section describes how the ACA can be used to obtain remedies
for women subject to adverse actions motivated by sex discrimination, and
to more generally transform obstetrics into a practice that puts more
emphasis on women’s autonomy.
D. The ACA’s Prohibition of Sex-Based Discrimination in Healthcare
The ACA’s civil rights provision embodies the first declaration that
patients are not to be discriminated against by health care providers based
on sex. Section 1557 is the first civil rights statute in health care.171 It is a
broad mandate, which explicitly refers to other, similar civil rights statutes,
including Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title IX of the U.S.
Education Amendments of 1972, and the Age Discrimination Act of
1975.172
Both the protected characteristics and the enforcement
mechanisms of these enumerated civil rights statutes apply to § 1557 of the
ACA. Thus, it is likely that the statute gives rise to both disparate
treatment and disparate impact theories of discrimination.173 Health care
providers might violate the statute with respect to sex discrimination in two
ways: first, through intentionally treating individuals unfavorably on the
basis of sex; and second, through having facially neutral policies or
practices that result in adverse, gender-based outcomes.
Section 1557 went into effect in January 2014, and very few cases have
been decided under the statute, so far. This is likely due to its newness—
and the options if offers in terms of enforcement mechanisms. Section
1557 creates a private right of action but also creates an administrative
remedy. Individuals who believe they have been discriminated against may
file a complaint with the Office for Civil Rights (OCR) of the U.S.
have been due to prior venereal disease); Powell v. Mullins, 479 So. 2d at 1120, 1123
(Ala. 1985) (emphasizing that the plaintiff’s obesity complicated the analysis of
causation in a case that involved a sponge left in the plaintiff’s abdomen).
170. Abrams, supra note 165, at 1980.
171. 42 U.S.C. § 18116 (2012).
172. Id.
173. Id.; see, e.g., McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 792 (1973)
(laying out the analysis for disparate treatment under Title VII); Griggs v. Duke Power
Co., 401 U.S. 424, 428 (1971) (establishing that there is a disparate impact theory for
liability under Title VII); Franklin v. Gwinnett Cnty. Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60, 61 (1992)
(finding a private cause of action for intentional discrimination under Title IX).
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Department of Health & Human Services (HHS) within 180 days of the
discriminatory action.174 The OCR will then investigate the complaint and
issue a finding.175 If discrimination is found, the discriminatory actor will
be given a time period in which to correct the discrimination or create a
plan of correction.176
Individuals who have been discriminated against may also file a
complaint in court, without first filing an administrative complaint.177 Very
few discrimination cases have been brought under Section 1557. In 2015, a
federal district court in Rumble v. Fairview Health Services found that a
transgender complainant sufficiently alleged sex discrimination under the
disparate treatment theory of Section 1557 and denied the defendant’s
motion to dismiss.178 The court found that the physician’s hostile treatment
of the plaintiff, which involved asking him embarrassing and aggressive
questions, as well as administering an “assaultive” physical examination,
“plausibly demonstrate[d]. . . discriminatory intent” prohibited by Section
1557.179 Several particulars of this court’s interpretation of Section 1557
may illuminate its potential protections for women seeking the care of a
midwife or seeking to give birth in a birth center. Procedurally noteworthy
were the court’s willingness to find a private right of action under Section
1557,180 its finding that Section 1557 applies to any healthcare provider that
receives any federal assistance,181 and its attempt to determine liability,
causation, and a standard of proof through looking to agency regulations,
which are currently nonexistent.182 Substantively, the court broadly
interpreted sex discrimination as encompassing adverse actions in
connection with sex stereotyping, in line with cases brought under Title VII
and Title IX.183
If courts continue to interpret sex-based discrimination broadly, pregnant
174. Office for Civil Rights, U.S. DEP’T. OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/office/.
175. How Does OCR Investigate a Civil Rights Complaint?, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH
& HUMAN SERVS., http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/civilrights/faq/Procedures/303.html.
176. Id.
177. 42 U.S.C. § 18116 (2012) (“The enforcement mechanisms provided for and
available under such title VI, title IX, section 504, or such Age Discrimination Act
shall apply for purposes of violations of this subsection.”).
178. Rumble v. Fairview Health Servs., No. 14-CV-2037 SRN/FLN, 2015 WL
1197415, at *31 (D. Minn. Mar. 16, 2015).
179. Id. at *18.
180. Id. at *11.
181. Id. at *12.
182. Id. at *31.
183. Id. at *2.
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women may have a cause of action for adverse actions rooted in not only
animus toward women, but also notions of how pregnant women and
mothers should act.184 Moreover, under both Title VII and Title IX, sexbased harassment, whether verbal or involving un-consented to touching,
that produces to a “hostile environment,” is encompassed within the
definition of sex discrimination.185 Under these analyses, a woman who is
pressured into or forcibly subjected to a procedure that is not necessary to
protect her life and health, as well as that of the fetus, but which simply
lessens a small risk to the fetus,186 may have a § 1557 claim against a
physician and the medical facility, if it does not have policies in place
regarding nondiscrimination toward pregnant women. Another example of
disparate treatment based on sex might involve derogatory comments made
by medical staff during childbirth toward the woman about her behavior or
her right to make medical decisions—like the remarks of the physician in
the case of the forced episiotomy discussed in Part III.187 An example of a
policy that might give rise to a disparate impact claim would be an
informed consent process that does not adequately inform women of the
risks of certain procedures, such as Cesarean Sections, VBACs, or
episiotomies, or through which women waive the right to object to such
procedures once they are admitted to labor and delivery. Such forms would
not be facially discriminatory, but would disproportionately subject women

184. See, e.g., Nevada Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 736 (2003)
(recognizing that actions based on stereotypes about mothers, rather than on actual
performance, constitute sex-based discrimination: “Stereotypes about women’s
domestic roles are reinforced by parallel stereotypes presuming a lack of domestic
responsibilities for men [. . .] These mutually reinforcing stereotypes created a selffulfilling cycle of discrimination that forced women to continue to assume the role of
primary family caregiver, and fostered employers’ stereotypical views about women’s
commitment to work and their value as employees.”).
185. Sexual Harassment Guidance 1997, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC. OFFICE FOR CIVIL
RIGHTS, (http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/sexhar01.html (last updated
Oct. 16 2015); Revised Sexual Harassment Guidance, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC. OFFICE FOR
CIVIL
RIGHTS,
(Jan.
19,
2001),
http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/shguide.html.
186. This was the case in Pemberton v. Tallahassee Mem’l Reg’l Med. Ctr., 66 F.
Supp. 2d 1247 (N.D. Fla. 1999) in which the risk of uterine rupture was debated by
experts, but was between 2 and 6 percent. After the patient in this case was forced to
undergo a VBAC (vaginal birth after Cesarean), she went on to have two more children
vaginally, which suggests the birth in question also would have been successful absent
the Cesarean.
187. Prior to performing the episiotomy without consent, the medical staff in
Kelly’s case said, ““We’re not going to feel it, remember? And you have the epidural,”
and “Listen: I am the expert here [. . .] But why can’t [you] try [to push]? You can go
home and do it. You go to Kentucky.” Kelly’s Story, supra note 128.
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to procedures without full informed consent or a right to refuse treatment,
creating the implication that pregnant women cannot be trusted to make
rational decisions about their bodies and about risks to the fetuses they are
carrying.188
Under Title VII and Title IX jurisprudence, employers and educational
institutions that discriminate based on sex may raise limited affirmative
defenses—these include cases of safety,189 cases in which there was a
“legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason” for the adverse action,190 and cases
in which plaintiffs failed to make use of institutional reporting
procedures.191 Significantly, Title VII cases have explored whether
protecting fetal life is an interest that may warrant discrimination.192
Courts have held that protecting an unborn fetus does not fall under the
umbrella of the safety-based affirmative defense for employers that
discriminate.193
This particular analysis is unlikely to extend to
discrimination against women in childbirth. Courts are likely to continue
to use the balancing test in Roe to weigh women’s rights of selfdetermination in medical care against state interests in fetal life. Decisions
under Title VII and Title IX have laid a strong groundwork, however, that
treating women adversely due to their sex or pregnancy is unlawful except
in rare circumstances. If courts or HHS create an exception to Section
1557 in line with the state’s interest in fetal life, they should ensure that this
is a narrow exception, which prioritizes the autonomy, health, and
wellbeing of the pregnant woman, in line with the spirit of the
nondiscrimination provision and other civil rights statutes.
CONCLUSION
Many barriers continue to frustrate women’s attempts to make informed
choices about childbirth. Legislatures and courts alike have exaggerated
risks to fetal life in order to proscribe professional or lay midwives and thus
limit access to home birth; insurance companies have refused to cover the
188. See Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 129 (2007) (considering the potential
future harm to women who would later regret their decision to have an abortion).
189. Int’l Union, United Auto., Aerospace & Agr. Implement Workers of Am.,
UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 201 (1991).
190. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 792 (1973).
191. Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. 2257, 2270 (1998); Faragher v. Boca
Raton, 118 S. Ct. 2275, 2293 (1998); Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 118 S. Ct.
1989 (1998).
192. Int’l Union, 499 U.S. at 219 (“The Court’s narrow interpretation of the BFOQ
defense in this case, however, means that an employer cannot exclude even pregnant
women from an environment highly toxic to their fetuses.”).
193. Id.
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services of a midwife or the costs of a birth at a birth center; physicians, in
an effort to reduce all possible risks to the fetus, have gained court orders to
compel medical treatment—even when it has put the life of the woman at
risk.
By prohibiting discrimination against licensed providers and sex-based
discrimination against patients, the ACA has made modest strides toward
increasing women’s control over components of childbirth. The remedies
under § 2706(a) and § 1557 are promising—especially for licensed
midwives and their clients, and women subjected to mistreatment by
medical staff during childbirth. Yet there remain significant hurdles for
women; these largely depend on their state—whether it licenses
professional and lay midwives; whether it licenses birth centers; whether its
courts are likely to issue a court order and have it overturned, rather than
risk harm to the fetus; whether its courts find that some risk to the woman’s
health is sufficient to outweigh the state interests in fetal life, or whether,
even in a life-or-death scenario, the court will prioritize fetal rights.
The ACA’s potential to remedy systematic discrimination against
pregnant women has not yet been tested, and if the statute will produce
results, it may be years before guards of women’s rights are embodied into
medical practice. In order to promote choice in childbirth even further, it
will be important for legislatures to continue to expand licensure and
regulation for midwives and birth centers and to create state laws that
bolster the ACA’s prohibition of sex-based discrimination in healthcare.
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